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This paper uses an open economy DSGE model to explore how trade openness affects the transmission
of domestic shocks. For some calibrations, closed and open economies appear dramatically different,
reminiscent of the implications of Mundell-Fleming style models. However, we argue such stark differences
hinge on calibrations that impose an implausibly high trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. Overall, our results suggest that the main effects of openness are on the composition
of expenditure, and on the wedge between consumer and domestic prices, rather than on the response
of aggregate output and domestic prices.
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With the rapid expansion in world trade during the past two decades, policymakers have
become increasingly interested in the consequences of greater trade openness for macroe-
conomic behavior. Considerable attention has focused on how external shocks may play a
more prominent role in driving domestic °uctuations as trade linkages grow, and as devel-
oping countries such as China exert a progressively larger in°uence on global energy and
commodity prices. Our paper examines a di®erent aspect of globalization that has received
less scrutiny in the recent literature. In particular, we investigate whether changes in trade
openness are likely to have a substantial impact on the transmission of domestic shocks.
Economists have long recognized that openness could potentially a®ect the responses of
real activity to domestic shocks, including to monetary and ¯scal policy. The Mundell (1962)
and Fleming (1962) framework showed that ¯scal shocks could have dramatically di®erent
e®ects depending on whether an economy was open or closed: in contrast to the stimulative
e®ect of a government spending rise on output in a closed economy, the same shock had no
e®ect on output in an open economy, as real exchange rate appreciation crowded out real
net exports.
A longstanding literature has also assessed the implications of openness for the e®ects
of domestic shocks on in°ation. Perhaps most obviously, economists drew attention to the
potential divergence between domestic prices and consumer prices in an open economy, re-
°ecting the sensitivity of the latter to import prices. But important contributions in the
1970s and early 1980s also analyzed how the behavior of domestic price-setting could be
a®ected by openness. In°uential work by Dornbusch (1983) linked the desired markup in a
monopolistic competition framework to the real exchange rate, and showed how the markup
could be expected to decline in response to real exchange rate appreciation (re°ecting in-
creased competitive pressure from abroad). In an NBER conference volume nearly a quarter
century ago, Dornbusch and Fischer (1984) used this framework to argue that changes in the
slope of the Phillips Curve due to increased trade openness were likely to have substantial
1implications for the transmission of monetary and ¯scal policy. Speci¯cally, these authors
argued that monetary shocks were likely to cause domestic prices to respond more quickly
due to an e®ective steepening of the Phillips Curve.
In this paper, we use a two country DSGE modeling framework to revisit the question of
how changes in trade openness a®ect the economy's responses to monetary and ¯scal shocks,
as well as to a representative supply shock.1 Our analysis is heavily in°uenced by several
important papers that compare the characteristics of optimal policy rules in closed and
open economies by Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2001), Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2002), and
Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2005).2 However, the main objective of these papers was to highlight
conditions under which the policy problem in closed and open economies was formally similar:
under such conditions, policy prescriptions from the closed economy carried over to the open
economy with suitable changes in parameters. Our paper di®ers substantially insofar as
its objective is to provide a quantitative assessment of the di®erences in the transmission
channel as the trade openness of the economy varies.
We focus much of our analysis on a simple \workhorse" open economy model that ex-
tends Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2005) by incorporating nominal wage rigidities and additional
shocks. Although our model allows for spillover e®ects between the two countries, it can be
approximated by a system of dynamic equations that parallels the closed economy model of
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) in the special case in which the home country's share
of world output becomes arbitrarily small. As in the Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000)
model, the presence of nominal wage rigidities confronts the policymaker with a tradeo®
between stabilizing in°ation and the output (or employment) gap. The parsimonious struc-
ture of our open economy model makes it easy to identify the economic channels through
which openness a®ects aggregate demand and supply, and hence the tradeo®s confronting
1 Our approach follows the seminal work of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) and a large subsequent literature
that incorporates nominal rigidities into microfounded open-economy DSGE models. See Lane (2001) for a
survey.
2 There is a burgeoning literature examining optimal monetary policy in an open-economy setting. Some
notable examples include Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and Devereux and Engel
(2003).
2policymakers. But while distinguishing these channels is useful for heuristic purposes, the
di®erences between the closed and open economies can be attributed to e®ects on a single
composite parameter that a®ects the behavioral equations in the same way as the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution parameter (¾) in a closed economy model: i.e., by a®ecting
the interest elasticity of aggregate demand, and the wealth e®ect on labor supply.3 Given
that this parameter can be expressed as a weighted average of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and the trade price elasticity, where the weight on the latter varies directly
with openness, it is straightforward to assess how changes in openness a®ect equilibrium
responses under a wide range of calibrations.
Our analysis shows that, in principle, there could be very pronounced divergence in the
e®ects of the domestic shocks on output and domestic in°ation as trade openness increases.
In particular, with both a very high trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, the enhanced ability to smooth consumption in the open economy markedly alters
the wealth e®ect of shocks on labor supply, and the slope of the household's MRS schedule
(tending to °atten it). These changes can have substantial e®ects on aggregate supply, and
through their e®ect on marginal costs, on domestic in°ation and output. Moreover, on
the aggregate demand side, higher openness increases the e®ective interest-elasticity of the
economy, provided that the trade price elasticity is higher than the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption. In the extreme case in which the trade price elasticity becomes
in¯nitely high, our workhorse model in fact implies that government spending shocks have
no e®ect on output.
However, under more empirically plausible values of the trade price elasticity, the struc-
tural relations determining domestic in°ation are not very sensitive to the parameters de-
termining openness. The interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand, or \slope" of the New
Keynesian IS curve, exhibits somewhat more variation with openness, re°ecting that the
trade price elasticity (of 1-1/2) is much higher than the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
3This extends the results of Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2005), who also showed that the e®ects of openness can
be summarized in a single composite parameter.
3tion of consumption under our benchmark calibration (so that putting a larger weight on the
former, as occurs with greater openness, increases the interest-sensitivity of the economy).
Overall, although openness does exert some e®ect on the responses of domestic in°ation,
output, and real interest rates to the in°ation target change, government spending, and
technology shocks we consider, the size of the changes seems quite modest given the wide
range of variation in the trade share examined (from 0 to 35 percent). The main implica-
tions of openness are apparent in the composition of the expenditure response, with exports
playing a larger role in a highly open economy, and in the wedge between consumer and
domestic prices.
We then proceed to consider several variants of our workhorse model. First, we compare
incomplete markets with the complete markets setting, and again conclude that openness
exerts fairly small e®ects unless the trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply
are quite high. Second, we consider endogenous capital accumulation, and ¯nd that the dif-
ferences between closed and open economies are even smaller than in our workhorse model,
re°ecting in part that endogenous capital boosts the interest-rate elasticity of domestic de-
mand. Third, we consider a speci¯cation in which imports are used as intermediate goods;
for reasonable calibrations of the import share, it seems to have small e®ects on our results.
Fourth, we examine the implications of a framework that allows for both local currency pric-
ing (as in Betts and Devereux (1996) and Devereux and Engel (2002)) and variable desired
markups in the spirit of Dornbusch. We ¯nd that these mechanisms can amplify di®erences
in the response of domestic in°ation as the degree of openness varies. For example, domestic
in°ation falls by less in response to a positive technology shock in a highly open economy,
re°ecting that the associated exchange rate depreciation reduces the price competitiveness
of imports (which encourages domestic producers to boost their markups). However, large
di®erences in trade openness appear required for these e®ects to show through quantitatively.
A natural question is whether the alternative speci¯cations suggested above would a®ect
our conclusions if they were incorporated into our model jointly rather than in isolation.
We address this question by examining the responses of the SIGMA model. SIGMA is a
4multicountry DSGE model used at the Federal Reserve Board for policy simulations, and
is well-suited to address this question insofar as it includes many of the key features of the
workhorse model and the variants, as well as various real rigidities designed to improve its
empirical performance (e.g., adjustment costs on imports). We consider the responses of the
SIGMA model to the same underlying shocks { including to the in°ation target, government
spending, and technology { and essentially corroborate our main ¯nding that the responses
of domestic in°ation and output are not particularly sensitive to openness.
This paper is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the simulations of the SIGMA
model in Section 2. This approach proves helpful both as a way of highlighting our main
results, and for pointing out some restrictive features of the heuristic models discussed in the
subsequent sections against the backdrop of this more general model (e.g., the implications
of abstracting from capital accumulation in the workhorse model). Section 3 describes the
workhorse model, and then assesses how openness a®ects the equilibrium under both °exible
and sticky prices. Section 4 considers several modi¯cations of the workhorse model. Section
5 concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Motivation
In this section, we use a two country version of the SIGMA model to illustrate how trade
openness a®ects the propagation of three di®erent domestic shocks, including a reduction in
the central bank's target in°ation rate, a rise in government spending, and a highly persistent
rise in technology. In the case of the shock to the in°ation target, we compare the model's
implications to historical episodes of disin°ation that occurred in the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom during the early 1980s and early 1990s. Readers who wish to skip
ahead to Sections 3 and 4 { in which we fully describe a much simpler workhorse DSGE
model and some variants to investigate the same questions { may do so without loss of
continuity.
52.1 SIGMA Simulations
SIGMA incorporates an array of nominal and real rigidities to help the model yield plau-
sible implications across a broad spectrum of domestic and international shocks.4 On the
aggregate demand side, it allows for habit persistence in consumption, costs of changing the
level of investment, and costs of adjusting trade °ows.5 Final consumption and investment
goods are produced using both domestically-produced goods and imports. International ¯-
nancial markets are incomplete, so that households are restricted to borrowing or lending
internationally through the medium of a non-state contingent bond. On the supply side,
prices are set in staggered Calvo-style contracts in both the home and foreign market, with
exporters setting their price in local currency terms, as in Betts and Devereux (1996) and
Devereux and Engel (2002). SIGMA embeds demand curves with non-constant elasticities
(NCES) that induce `strategic complementarity' in price setting (as in Kimball (1995)). In
the spirit of Dornbusch (1983), this feature implies that the desired markup varies in re-
sponse to real exchange rate °uctuations, creating an incentive for ¯rms to charge di®erent
prices in home and foreign markets even under fully °exible prices. As shown by Bergin and
Feenstra (2001), Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), and Gust and Sheets (2006), it can
account for low exchange rate passthrough to import prices. Wages are also set in staggered
Calvo-style contracts.6
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule in which the nominal interest rate
responds to the deviation of domestic in°ation from the central bank's in°ation target and
to the output gap. Government purchases are exogenous, have no direct e®ect on the utility
of households, and are ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes.
4An inclusive description of SIGMA is provided by Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) for the case in which
product demand is characterized by a Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator, implying a constant desired markup.
Gust and Sheets (2006) extend the model to allow for variable desired markups, as in the version used in
this paper, though they abstract from capital accumulation and examine a smaller array of shocks.
5Our speci¯cation of habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs on investment follows Smets
and Wouters (2003).
6Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), SIGMA incorporates dynamic indexation of both
price and wage contracts, though the latter are indexed to past aggregate wage in°ation.
6Figure 1 shows the e®ects of a one percentage point permanent reduction in the home
country's in°ation target under three di®erent calibrations of trade openness. The solid line
shows the e®ects under our benchmark calibration based on U.S. data, so that the ratio of
imports to GDP is 12 percent. The dashed line shows an alternative in which we lower the
import share to 1 percent (labeled \nearly closed"), while the dotted line shows a second
alternative in which the import share is 35 percent (\high openness").7 The horizontal axis
shows quarters that have elapsed following the shock.
The e®ects of the reduction in the in°ation target are qualitatively similar regardless
of the degree of openness. The reduction in the in°ation target requires policymakers to
increase interest rates, causing output to contract and the real exchange rate (not shown)
to appreciate. Private absorption falls in response to the higher interest rates, and exports
also decline due to the induced appreciation of the real exchange rate. Both domestic and
consumer price in°ation fall, and roughly converge to their new target level after two years.
Perhaps somewhat remarkably, the responses of key macro aggregates { including output,
domestic price in°ation, and the real interest rate { show little quantitative variation with
di®erent degrees of openness. The sacri¯ce ratio { which we measure as the sum of (annu-
alized) output gaps in the twenty quarters following the start of the disin°ation, divided by
the change in the in°ation rate of one percentage point { is about 1.1 under each calibration.
Aside from the slightly larger initial output decline under the high openness calibration, the
main di®erences in the responses are compositional. For the highly open economy, more
of the output contraction is attributable to a fall in real net exports; in addition, given
the larger share of imported goods in the consumption basket, there is a greater disparity
between the response of consumer price in°ation and domestic price in°ation.
The similarity in the responses of output, domestic price in°ation, and the real interest
rate is mainly attributable to two factors. First, the interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand
only rises slightly as trade openness increases. Although our benchmark calibration imposes
7 In these experiments, we vary openness by changing the share parameter in the NCES aggregators used
to produce consumption and investment from the home and foreign goods.
7a rather high long-run trade price elasticity of 1-1/2, providing a strong channel (through
the uncovered interest parity condition) for real interest rates to in°uence exports, private
absorption has a comparable interest-sensitivity due to the high responsiveness of investment.
This can be garnered from the bottom panels of the ¯gure: exports only contract a bit more
sharply than private absorption in response to higher real interest rates. This helps to explain
why output only shows a slightly larger contraction under a 35 percent trade share than in
the case in which the trade share is only 1 percent of GDP. 8 The second factor is that desired
price markups and real marginal costs do not change signi¯cantly with greater openness, so
that domestic price in°ation responds very similarly across the di®erent calibrations. Overall,
these results do not indicate a signi¯cant quantitative \steepening" of the Phillips Curve due
to greater openness in response to this particular shock.9
Interestingly, historical episodes of disin°ation in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom seem reasonably supportive of the model's implications. Figure 2 shows
the evolution of in°ation (measured as the annual changes in the GDP de°ator) and the
output gap (as measured by the OECD) for the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom for two di®erent periods of disin°ation (the early 1980s and early 1990s). As
seen in the left column of Figure 2, in°ation in both the United States and Canada fell
from roughly 10 percent to 4 percent during the disin°ations that occurred during the early
1980s, while the output gap expanded (in absolute value) by roughly 6-7 percent in each
country. The sacri¯ce ratio in the United Kingdom was somewhat lower during that episode,
as in°ation fell by considerably more, while the output gap expanded by a similar amount.
8 Given the presence of adjustment costs on the expenditure components, the interest-sensitivity depends
on how persistent an e®ect the shock has on the real interest rate. For shocks that exert more persistent e®ects
on real interest rates, exports show a relatively higher interest-sensitivity than private domestic demand, and
the aggregate interest-sensitivity of the economy rises more substantially with openness. For example, the
interest-sensitivity rises more with greater openness under an alternative model calibration that increases
the duration of wage and price contracts (since the real interest rate response in that case is more persistent).
Similarly, the government spending shock below has a more persistent impact on the real interest rate, with
the implication that the economy becomes more interest-sensitive with greater openness.
9The limited variation in the desired markup re°ects that the real interest rate shows a fairly transient
rise, and hence the real exchange rate does not appreciate much. Under an alternative model calibration
implying a more persistent rise in real interest rates { derived by assuming longer contract durations { desired
markups and hence in°ation show more variation with openness.
8In the 1990s, the three experiences also were reasonably similar, with Canada perhaps having
a somewhat higher sacri¯ce ratio than the United States, and the United Kingdom a slightly
lower sacri¯ce ratio. Thus, while the evidence is somewhat noisy, the sacri¯ce ratio does not
appear to vary with openness in a systematic way.10
Figure 3 shows the e®ects of an increase in government spending.11 From a qualitative
perspective, the government spending hike has similar e®ects on key macroeconomic variables
across the alternative calibrations. The expansion in aggregate demand initially raises output
and real interest rates. Higher real interest rates and an induced appreciation of the real
exchange rate eventually cause output to revert towards baseline due to a crowding out of
private domestic demand and real net exports. Domestic in°ation rises because of a positive
output gap, and because the expansion in the level of output puts additional upward pressure
on marginal cost; the latter e®ect re°ects the interplay of diminishing returns and nominal
wage rigidity, so that the real wage remains above the level that would prevail under °exible
wage adjustment.12
Comparing the alternative calibrations, it is evident that higher openness mitigates the
rise in output, short-term real interest rates, and in°ation. Quite intuitively, a highly open
economy can rely on a decline in real net exports to alleviate pressure on domestic resources:
under our benchmark calibration, this e®ect is large enough to imply that the ¯scal shock
imparts less stimulus to domestic output, and boosts interest rates by less. Nevertheless, the
di®erences in the output responses are not especially pronounced given the wide variation in
trade shares examined, and even di®erences in the response of short-term interest rates are
small after a few years (i.e., given the expectations theory holds in our log-linearized model,
10 Ball (1994) reached similar conclusions based on sacri¯ce ratios for a much larger set of episodes. Our
approach di®ers insofar as we compare sacri¯ce ratios across countries over similar time periods (rather
than pooling all episodes together) as a rough means of controlling for di®erent levels of monetary policy
credibility.
11 Government spending is modelled as an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coe±cient equal to 0.97.
12Thus, even if the monetary rule were aggressive enough to close the output gap, the gap between the
real wage and °exible price real wage would put upward pressure on marginal cost and in°ation. We provide
an extensive discussion of the implications of the \real wage gap" for marginal cost and in°ation in Section
3.7.
9longer-term real interest rates show much less divergence). Thus, the more salient di®erences
across calibrations are in the composition of the expenditure response. In a relatively closed
economy, falling private absorption (especially investment) bears the burden of adjustment,
while a decline in real net exports is the catalyst for adjustment in a highly open economy.
The responses of domestic price in°ation exhibit fairly substantial variation with trade
openness, with the peak in°ation response only about half as large in the highly open econ-
omy as in the nearly closed economy. Under a Taylor rule, the output gap (not shown) is
smaller in the highly open economy, re°ecting the higher interest elasticity of aggregate de-
mand. Moreover, the smaller expansion in the level of output also puts less upward pressure
on marginal costs (the latter is relevant because wages are sticky). Finally, given that the
fall in import prices has a larger e®ect on consumer prices when trade openness is high,
the responses of consumer price in°ation show even more divergence than those of domestic
in°ation.
Figure 4 shows a persistent increase in the level of technology.13 The e®ects are qual-
itatively similar across the three calibrations. In each case, output has a hump-shaped
response peaking around ¯ve or six quarters after the shock, both domestic and consumer
price in°ation fall on impact, and the real exchange rate depreciates.
The fall in domestic price in°ation occurs because wages adjust slowly to their higher
post-shock level. Openness tends to mute the decline in domestic price in°ation through two
channels. First, it reduces the magnitude of the rise in the real wage. This is because the real
exchange rate depreciation retards the expansion in consumption as the economy becomes
more open, so that the wealth e®ect on labor supply is smaller. Second, the depreciation
of the real exchange rate and consequent rise in import prices induce domestic producers to
raise their markup, as they feel less competition from foreign producers. In a more open
economy, the pricing decisions of foreign exporters becomes relatively more important to the
price decisions of domestic ¯rms; thus, the rise in import prices plays a more noticeable role
in moderating the fall in domestic prices.
13 The technology shock is an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coe±cient equal to 0.97.
10Finally, there are pronounced di®erences in the composition of the output response as
openness increases, with real exports playing a more prominent role, as well as in the degree
of divergence between consumer and domestic price in°ation. Notably, given that exchange
rate depreciation pushes up import prices, consumer prices show much less of a decline in
the highly open economy.
3 The Workhorse Model
Our workhorse model builds heavily on the small open economy model of Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli
(2005), which we extend to a two country setting. Because these countries may di®er in
population size, but are otherwise isomorphic, our exposition focuses on the \home" country.
Each country in e®ect produces a single domestic output good, though we adopt a standard
monopolistically competitive framework to rationalize stickiness in the aggregate price level.
Households consume both the domestically-produced good and an imported good. Household
preferences are assumed to be of the constant elasticity form, which allows us to analyze the
implications of home bias, and a price elasticity of import demand di®erent from unity.
Finally, we generalize the Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2005) model by incorporating nominal wage
rigidities.
3.1 Households and Wage Setting
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive households indexed by h 2 [0;1], each
of which supplies a di®erentiated labor service to an intermediate goods-producing sector
(the only producers demanding labor services in our framework). It is convenient to assume
that a representative labor aggregator (or \employment agency") combines households' labor
hours in the same proportions as ¯rms would choose. Thus, the aggregator's demand for
each household's labor is equal to the sum of ¯rms' demands. The aggregate labor index Lt









11where µw > 0 and Nt(h) is hours worked by each member of household h. The parameter ³
is the size of a household of type h. It determines the size of the home country's population,
and e®ectively the share of world output produced by the home country in the steady state.
The aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate labor index,
taking each household's wage rate Wt (h) as given, and then sells units of the labor index to









It is natural to interpret Wt as the aggregate wage index. The aggregator's demand for the






















where Ct (h) and Nt (h) denote each household's current consumption and hours of labor,
respectively (which are assumed to be identical across the household's individual members).
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, ¾, satis¯es ¾ > 0, and we assume
that 0 < ¯ < 1, Â > 0, and Â0 > 0.
Household h faces a °ow budget constraint in period t which states that combined ex-





»t;t+1Bt+1(h) = Bt(h) + (1 + ¿w)Wt (h)Nt (h) + RKtK + ¡t (h) ¡ Tt (h): (5)
(where variables have been expressed in per capita terms). We assume that household h can
trade a complete set of contingent claims, with »t;t+1 denoting the price of an asset that will
pay one unit of domestic currency in a particular state of nature at date t+1, and Bt+1(h) the
quantity of claims purchased (for notational simplicity, we have suppressed all of the state
12indices.) Each household purchases the consumption good at a price PCt, and earns (per
capita) labor income of (1+¿W)Wt (h)Nt (h), where ¿W is an employment subsidy (designed
to allow the °exible price equilibrium to be e±cient). Each household also has a ¯xed stock
of capital (K) which it leases to ¯rms at the rental rate RKt. It receives an aliquot share
¡t (h) of the pro¯ts of all ¯rms, and pays lump sum taxes, Tt (h) to the government. In every
period t, household h maximizes the utility functional (4) with respect to its consumption
and holdings of contingent claims subject to its budget constraint (5), taking bond prices,
the rental price of capital, and the price of the consumption bundle as given.
We assume that household wages are determined by Calvo-style staggered contracts sub-
ject to wage indexation. In particular, with probability 1 ¡»w, each household is allowed to
reoptimize its wage contract. If a household is not allowed to optimize its wage rate, it re-
sets its wage according to Wt(h) = !t¡1Wt¡1(h), where !t = Wt=Wt¡1. Household h chooses














ÂgNt+j(h) = 0; (6)
where ¤t is the marginal value of a unit of consumption, and Vwt+j =
Qj
h=1 !t+h¡1. The
employment subsidy ¿W is chosen to exactly o®set the monopolistic distortion µW, so that
the household's marginal rate of substitution would equal the consumption real wage in the
absence of nominal wage rigidities.
3.2 Firms and Price Setting
Production of Domestic Intermediate Goods. There is a continuum of di®erenti-
ated intermediate goods (indexed by i 2 [0;1]) in the home country, each of which is produced
by a single monopolistically competitive ¯rm. These di®erentiated goods are combined into









13by a representative ¯rm, or \domestic goods aggregator," that is a perfect competitor in















Intermediate good i is produced by a monopolistically competitive ¯rm, whose output
Yt(i) is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt (i) = Kt(i)
®(ZtLt(i))
1¡®; (9)
where ® > 0 and Zt denotes a stationary, country-speci¯c shock to the level of technology.
Intermediate goods producers face perfectly competitive factor markets for hiring capital
and labor. Thus, each ¯rm chooses Kt (i) and Lt (i), taking as given both the rental price
of capital RKt and the aggregate wage index Wt. Within a country, both capital and labor
are completely mobile; thus, the standard static ¯rst-order conditions for cost minimization










Similar to household wages, the domestic-currency prices of ¯rms are determined accord-
ing to Calvo-style staggered contracts subject to indexation. In particular, ¯rm i faces a
constant probability, 1 ¡ »p, of being able to re-optimize its price, PDt(i). If ¯rm i can not
re-optimize its price in period t, the ¯rm resets its price according to PDt(i) = ¼t¡1PDt¡1(i)






pÃt;t+j [(1 + ¿p)VDt+jPDt (i)Yt+j (i) ¡ MCt+jYt+j (i)]; (11)
taking Ãt;t+j, MCt, ¿p, VDt, and its demand schedule as given. Here, Ãt;t+j is the stochastic
discount factor, VDt+j is de¯ned as VDt+j =
Qj
h=1 ¼t+h¡1, and ¿p is a production subsidy that













Yt+j (i) = 0: (12)
Production of Consumption Goods. Final consumption goods are produced by a
perfectly competitive \consumption good distributor." The representative distributor com-
bines purchases of the domestically-produced composite good, CDt (obtained from the do-
mestic goods distributor), with an imported good, MCt, to produce private consumption,

















We assume that the form of this CES aggregator mirrors the preferences of households
over consumption of domestically-produced goods and imports. Accordingly, the quasi-share
parameter !c in equation (13) may be interpreted as determining household preferences for
foreign relative to domestic goods. In the steady state, !c is the share of imports in the
household's consumption bundle, so that the import share of the economy is determined as
the product of !c and the (private) consumption share of GDP.
The distributor sells its ¯nal consumption good to households at price PCt and also
purchases the home and foreign composite goods at their respective prices, PDt and PMt.
We assume that producers of the composite domestic and foreign goods practice producer
currency pricing. Accordingly, PMt = etP ¤
Dt, where et is the exchange rate expressed as units
of domestic currency required to purchase one unit of foreign currency and P ¤
Dt is the price
of the foreign composite good in the foreign currency (we use an asterisk to denote foreign
variables). Pro¯t maximization implies that the demand schedules for the imported and
14 As discussed earlier in the household problem, we de¯ned »t;t+j to be the price in period t of a claim
that pays one dollar if the speci¯ed state occurs in period t + j. Thus, the corresponding element of Ãt;t+j
equals »t;t+j divided by the probability that the speci¯ed state will occur.


























According to equation (15), in an open economy, the consumer price level depends on both
domestic and foreign prices, while if an economy is closed to trade (i.e., !c = 0), consumer
prices depend only on domestic prices.
3.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We assume that the central bank follows an interest rate reaction function:
it = °¼(¼t ¡ ¼
T
t ) + °y(yt ¡ y
pot
t ); (16)
where the variables have been speci¯ed as the logarithmic deviation from its steady state
value. The nominal interest rate responds to the deviation of domestic price in°ation from
the central bank's exogenous in°ation target, ¼T
t , and the deviation of output from potential
output (ypot), where potential output is de¯ned as the economy's level of output in the
absence of sticky wages and prices.
As noted above, openness can give rise to important di®erences between the domestic
price level and the consumer price level. We specify a rule that responds to domestic price
in°ation rather than consumer price in°ation in order to minimize di®erences between an
open and closed economy that would simply be attributable to the monetary rule, rather
than to di®erences in the underlying structure of the economy.
The government purchases some of the domestically produced good. Government pur-
chases, Gt, are assumed to follow an exogenous, stochastic process. The government's budget
is balanced every period so that lump sum taxes equal government spending plus the subsidy
to ¯rms and households.
163.4 Market Clearing
The home economy's aggregate resource constraint can be written as:






where the inclusion of the relative population size
³¤
³ re°ects that all variables are expressed
in per capita terms, and M¤
Ct denotes the purchases of the domestically-produced good









Finally, we assume that the structure of the foreign economy is isomorphic to that of the
home country.
3.5 Benchmark Calibration
Three key parameters that play a crucial role in in°uencing our results are the price elasticity
for trade, ´c =
1+½c
½c , the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ¾, and the labor supply
elasticity, Â. While we choose benchmark values of these parameters to be consistent with
our interpretation of the evidence, it is important to note that there is wide range of values
for these parameters used in the literature and thus we also consider alternative calibrations.
For the trade price elasticity, we assume that ½c = 2 which implies ´c =
1+½c
½c = 1:5. This
estimate is towards the higher end of estimates derived using macroeconomic data, which are
typically below unity in the short run and near unity in the long run (e.g., Hooper, Johnson,
and Marquez (2000)). Nevertheless, estimates of this elasticity following a tari® change are
typically much higher, and we consider higher values in alternative calibrations.15
We choose the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be an intermediate value between
estimates derived from two separate literatures. In the micro literature, estimates of the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion, which correspond to the inverse of the intertemporal
15 For a discussion of the macro estimates and estimates after trade liberalizations, see Ruhl (2005).
17elasticity of substitution suggest values in the range of 0.2-0.7.16 In contrast, the business
cycle literature frequently uses log utility over consumption (i.e., ¾ = 1) to be consistent with
balanced growth. We set ¾ = 0:5 as a compromise between these two di®erent perspectives.
The parameter Â corresponds to the inverse of the (Frisch) wage elasticity of labor supply.
A vast amount of evidence from micro-data suggests labor supply elasticities in the range of
0.05-0.3, though the real business cycle literature tends to use much higher values.17 We set
Â = 5 for the benchmark calibration, which is at the upper end of estimates from the micro
data.
We choose the remaining parameters of the model as follows. Given that the model is
calibrated at a quarterly frequency, our choice of ¯ = 0:9925 implies an annualized real
interest rate of 3 percent. The government spending share of output is set to 18 percent, so
gy = 0:18. We set the elasticity of capital in production function, ® = 0:35 and choose Â0 so
that hours worked are normalized to unity in steady state. For the price and wage markup
parameters, we choose µp = µw = 0:2, and set the corresponding subsidies to equivalent
values, ¿p = ¿w = 0:2. We choose »p and »w to be consistent with four quarter contracts
(subject to full indexation). Finally, we set the relative population size of the home economy
(
³
³¤) to 1/3. This value implies that the home economy corresponds to 25 percent of world
output, which is roughly consistent with the U.S. share of world output.
3.6 The Flexible Price and Wage Equilibrium
It is useful to begin our analysis by investigating the behavior of a log-linearized version
of the workhorse model under the assumption that wages and prices are fully °exible. For
heuristic reasons, we conduct this analysis under the assumption that home country is a small
enough fraction of world output that any spillovers to the foreign country (in particular, to
16 See, for example, Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio and Weber (1997), or Barsky, Juster, Kimball,
and Shapiro (1997).
17MacCurdy (1986) obtained a point estimate of 0.15 for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for men,
a ¯nding largely con¯rmed in the literature (e.g., Altonji (1986), Card (1994), and more recently Pencavel
(2002)). For an alternative view, see Mulligan (1998). Finally, there is more uncertainty regarding the labor
supply elasticity for females. For this group, Pencavel (1998) obtained a point estimate of 0.21.
18interest rates and domestic demand) can be ignored. Insofar as we have veri¯ed by model
simulations that spillovers from domestic shocks to the foreign sector are small even when
the home country constitutes 25 percent of world output (as in our benchmark calibration),
examining the model's implications under the assumption of a very small world output
share yields considerable insight. Thus, our analysis here closely parallels that of Gal¶ ³ and
Monacelli (2005), aside from modest di®erences arising from our inclusion of a government
spending shock, and allowing for diminishing returns to labor. However, while their paper
focused on the formal similarity between open and closed economy models, our goal is to
explore the quantitative di®erences that arise as an economy becomes more open, and how
these di®erences depend on underlying structural parameters such as trade price elasticities.
We begin by deriving a relationship between output and the domestic real interest rate,
which Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2005) and Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2002) have characterized
as an open economy IS curve. Substituting the (log-linearized) production function for ¯nal
consumption goods (13) into the resource constraint (17), the latter may be expressed:
yt = (1 ¡ gy)(ct + !c(m
¤
ct ¡ mct)) + gygt (19)
where small letters denote the deviations of the logarithms of variables from their corre-
sponding level, and gy is the government share of output. The risk-sharing condition under
complete markets can be used to relate private consumption to foreign consumption c¤
t and
to the terms of trade ¿t:
ct = c
¤
t + ¾(1 ¡ !c)¿t = c
¤
t + ²c¿t (20)
where the parameter ²c = ¾(1 ¡ !c) denotes the sensitivity of private consumption to the
terms of trade. Using the export and import demand functions, the di®erence between real
exports and imports m¤
ct ¡ mct may be expressed:
m
¤
ct ¡ mct = (c
¤
t ¡ ct) + (1 + (1 ¡ !c))´c¿t = (c
¤
t ¡ ct) + ²nx¿t (21)
Thus, real net exports depend on an activity term (rising as foreign consumption expands
relative to domestic consumption), and on the terms of trade. Because a one percent deteri-
19oration of the terms of trade raises exports by an amount equal to the export price elasticity
of demand ´c, while causing real imports to contract by (1 ¡!c)´c, the overall relative price
sensitivity of net exports is captured by the composite parameter ²nx = (1 + (1 ¡ !c))´c.
Substituting these expressions into the resource constraint (19) yields:




yt = (1 ¡ gy)¾
open¿t + gygt + (1 ¡ gy)c
¤
t (23)
The parameter ¾open = ((1 ¡ !c)²c + !c²nx) may be interpreted as either the sensitivity
of private aggregate demand to the terms of trade, or the (absolute value of) the sensitivity
of private aggregate demand to the long-term real rate of interest. The latter follows from
the UIP condition:
¿t = Et¿t+1 + r
¤





t+j ¡ rt+j) = (r
¤
Lt ¡ rLt) (24)
where the long-term real interest rate rLt is an in¯nite sum of expected short-term real
interest rates (rt+j). Alternatively, equation (23) can be expressed in terms of the current
short-term real interest rate to yield an \open economy IS curve" of the form:
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ gy)¾
open(rt ¡ r
¤





Based on the foregoing analysis, the interest-sensitivity of private demand ¾open can be
regarded as a weighted average of the interest-sensitivity of consumption ²c, and of real net
exports ²nx, with the interest-sensitivity of the latter arising from the UIP relation, and
depending on the trade price elasticity. With some algebraic manipulation, ¾open can be
expressed alternatively as a simple weighted average of the underlying structural parameters
¾ (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption) and ´c (the price elasticity of
both exports and imports):
¾
open = (1 ¡ !c)
2¾ + (1 ¡ (1 ¡ !c)
2)´c (26)
20The quadratic weight (1 ¡!c)2 on ¾ re°ects both that consumption gets an e®ective weight
of (1 ¡ !c) in private demand (as seen from equation 22), and that the elasticity of private
consumption with respect to the domestic real interest rate (²c = ¾(1¡!c)) declines linearly
as the share of foreign goods rises in the domestic consumption bundle.
Equation (26) provides con¯rmation of the intuitively plausible argument that the
interest-sensitivity of the economy should rise with openness if the trade price elasticity is
high relative to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption; and conversely,
if the trade price elasticity is relatively low.18 Formally, the derivative of ¾open with respect
to !c equals 2(1¡!c)(´c¡¾), and hence rises if ´c > ¾. Thus, even if consumption responded
very little to the domestic real interest rate { implying a low interest-elasticity of output in
a closed economy { output could still be highly interest-sensitive in an open economy if the
interest rate changes generated large movements in real exports and imports (through their
in°uence on the the terms of trade).
From a quantitative perspective, the quadratic weights in (26) imply that openness can
have very substantial implications for the interest-sensitivity of the economy if there is a
signi¯cant divergence between the intertemporal elasticity ¾ and the trade price elasticity
´c. This is apparent from Table 1, which shows how the interest-elasticity of aggregate
demand ¾open varies with openness for alternative values of ¾ and ´c. For example, using
a trade share of !c = :35, the weight on ¾ in determining the interest-elasticity of private
demand is only 0:42(= (1¡:35)2). In this case, an open economy with ¾ = 0:5 and ´c = 1:5
{ as in our benchmark calibration { implies ¾open = 1:1, or more than double the interest-
sensitivity of its closed economy counterpart. With an even higher trade price elasticity of
6, ¾open rises to 3.6, or more than seven times its closed-economy counterpart. However,
changes in the e®ective interest-sensitivity of aggregate output due to openness are almost
18In closely related work, Woodford (2007) examines how the monetary transmission mechanism changes
with the degree of trade openness in a sticky price model. His model speci¯cation imposes a trade price
elasticity of unity, and he calibrates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ¾ = 6 to proxy for the high
interest rate sensitivity of investment. Accordingly, in his calibration, an increase in openness lowers the
interest rate sensitivity of the economy.
21certainly much smaller than suggested by this latter computation, and probably signi¯cantly
smaller than implied by our workhorse model which ignores capital. As we show below, to
the extent that the disparity between the e®ective interest-sensitivity of domestic demand
and that of real trade narrows in a model with capital accumulation, the interest-sensitivity
of the economy shows less variation with openness.
We next turn to the determinants of employment, output, and the real wage (which we
will refer to as potential employment, potential output, and the potential real wage in the
model with sticky prices). If prices are °exible, ¯rms behave identically in setting prices
and hiring factor inputs, so that there is e®ectively a single representative ¯rm. The labor
demand schedule is derived directly from the representative ¯rm's optimality condition for
choosing its price, which equates the marginal product of labor to the product real wage
(n.b., the product real wage is expressed in units of the domestically produced good). Thus,
the (inverse) labor demand schedule may be expressed:
³
d
t = mplt = (1 ¡ ®)zt ¡ ®Lt; (27)
so that the \demand real wage" ³d
t varies inversely with hours worked. Clearly, both the
slope of this schedule and the manner in which it is a®ected by shocks is identical to a closed
economy.
The labor supply schedule is derived from the household's optimality condition equating
its marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to the consumption real
wage. It is convenient to express labor supply in terms of the product real wage, so that:
³
s
t = mrst = ÂLt +
1
¾
ct + !c¿t (28)
where mrst should be interpreted as the marginal cost of working in terms of the domestically
produced good. The terms of trade enters as an additional shift variable. A depreciation
of the terms of trade shifts the labor supply schedule inward, because a given product real
wage translates into a smaller consumption real wage.
For heuristic purposes, it is useful to derive a labor supply schedule that is expressed
exclusively in terms of labor (or output) and endogenous shocks, as is familiar from the
22closed economy analogue, i.e.,
³
s;closed





((1 ¡ ®)(Lt + zt) ¡ gygct) (29)
This is easily accomplished by using equation (23) to solve for the terms of trade in
terms of output, and then the risk-sharing condition (20) to solve for consumption in terms
of output. Finally, using the production function to solve for output in terms of labor, the
labor supply function may be expressed:
³
s













It is clear from comparing equation (30) with its closed economy analogue (29) that openness
can only alter the impact of domestic shocks on the labor market through the parameter
¾open. This parameter can be interpreted as determining the wealth e®ect on labor supply
in an open economy, in°uencing both the slope of the labor supply schedule, and how it
is a®ected by shocks. Given the dependence of the \primitive" labor supply schedule (28)
on both consumption and the terms of trade, the wealth e®ect in (30) captures the e®ects
of movements in both variables. From our earlier derivation of the open-economy IS curve,
¾open rises relative to the intertemporal elasticity ¾ if the trade price elasticity ´c exceeds
¾. Intuitively, a relatively high degree of substitutibility between home and foreign goods
should enhance opportunities for international risk-sharing, serving to weaken the relation-
ship between consumption and output, and hence the wealth e®ect on labor supply.
Figure 5 illustrates how openness a®ects labor market equilibrium in response to a tech-
nology shock through changing both the slope of the labor supply schedule, and the extent to
which it shifts in response to the shock. The left panel shows the response in a closed econ-
omy, while the right panel shows the response in an open economy. The technology shock
shifts the labor demand schedule up by one percent in both the closed and open economy
(recalling that this schedule is the same in each). In the closed economy, the wealth e®ect
on labor supply is determined by the parameter ¾ (in equation (29)), which is assumed to be
less than unity. Accordingly, the wealth e®ect on labor supply dominates the substitution
23e®ect. In the new equilibrium at point B, hours worked decline, and the real wage rises.
Turning to the open economy case, the structural parameters are assumed to imply a value
of ¾open in equation (30) that signi¯cantly exceeds unity (as would occur with a high value
of the trade price elasticity, and high degree of openness). In this case, the open economy
MRS schedule shifts inward by much less (i.e., from A to E) than its closed economy coun-
terpart (from A to D in the left panel). In addition to reducing the shift in the schedule,
the smaller wealth e®ect implies a °atter MRS schedule. Accordingly, with the substitution
e®ect dominating the wealth e®ect, labor hours expand, and the real wage rises by less than
in the closed economy.
From a quantitative perspective, openness can have sizeable macroeconomic consequences
under calibrations of structural parameters that imply a large wedge between ¾open and ¾,
and that embed a high Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1
Â. The Frisch elasticity is relevant
because it determines the sensitivity of the MRS slope (of Â + 1¡®
(1¡gy)¾open). As the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply and the trade price elasticity become very large, the labor supply
schedule °attens, and also becomes unresponsive to the technology and government spending
shocks. Under these limiting conditions, the productivity shock exerts a large e®ect on
output with no impact on the real wage. The government spending shock has no e®ect on
output, employment, or wages, which is reminiscient of the dramatically di®erent e®ects
of ¯scal expansion on output in a closed versus open economy that obtain in a traditional
Mundell-Fleming style model.
However, although increased openness can have large e®ects in principle, it has much
less dramatic implications for °exible-price employment, output, and the real wage under
plausible calibrations. This is apparent from Tables 1 and 2, which show how the responses
of these key variables in the °exible price equilibrium vary with openness under a wide
range of values of the trade price elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption (the superscript \pot" on each variable is used to denote \potential" responses,
meaning the responses under °exible prices and wages). Table 1 shows responses under a
Frisch elasticity of 0.2, as in our benchmark calibration, while Table 2 considers a higher
24elasticity of unity. Importantly, for trade price elasticities in the empirically-reasonable
neighborhood of 1 to 1.5, and a Frisch elasticity of unity or below, di®erences between the
closed and open economy responses to a technology shock are quite small, and only modestly
larger in the case of a government spending shock.
3.7 Sticky Prices and Wages
We next turn to analyzing the model's behavior in the presence of nominal wage and price
rigidities. We continue to maintain the assumption that the relative share of the home
economy in world output is arbitrarily small. In this case, the log-linearized behavioral
equations can be expressed in a simple form that is essentially identical to that derived in
the closed economy model of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), aside from allowing for
the indexation of wages and prices:
xt = xt+1jt ¡ ¾
open(1 ¡ gy)(it ¡ ¼t+1jt ¡ r
pot
t ) (31)
¢¼t = ¯¢¼t+1jt + ·p(³t ¡ MPLt) (32)
¢!t = ¯¢!t+1jt + ·w(MRSt ¡ ³t) (33)
MPLt = ³
pot














³t = ³t¡1 + !t ¡ ¼t (36)
where xt is the output gap (i.e., yt¡y
pot





\potential" (or \natural") rate of interest, ³
pot
t the potential real wage, and the composite
25parameters are de¯ned by ·p =
(1¡»p)(1¡¯»p)
»p , ·w =
(1¡»w)(1¡¯»w)
»w(1+Â 1+µw
µw ) , ¸mrs = Â + 1¡®
¾open(1¡gy), and
¸mpl = ®. The potential level of a variable is de¯ned as the value it would assume if prices
and wages were fully °exible. The model is completed with the inclusion of the monetary
rule given in equation (16).
Equation (31) parsimoniously expresses the open economy IS curve in terms of output and
real interest rate gaps. Thus, the output gap depends inversely on the deviation of the real
interest rate (it¡¼t+1jt) from its potential rate r
pot
t . The price-setting equation (32) speci¯es
the change in domestic price in°ation to depend on the future expected change in in°ation
and real marginal cost, where the latter is the di®erence between the real wage and marginal
product of labor. The wage-setting equation (33) speci¯es the change in wage in°ation to
depend on the future expected change in wage in°ation and the di®erence between the MRS
and real wage (both in product terms). The equations determining the MPL (34) and MRS
(35) can be speci¯ed to depend only on the real wage under °exible prices ³
pot
t , and the
employment gap (or equivalently, the output gap, since the latter is proportional). Finally,
equation (36) is an identity for the evolution of the product real wage.
The log-linearized representation given by equations (31) - (36) is insightful in helping to
assess how openness a®ects the transmission of domestic shocks under a given policy rule, and
also the policymaker's tradeo® frontier under certain commonly speci¯ed loss functions. In
particular, equations (31) - (36) identify several channels through which openness can a®ect
the economy. It is evident from (31) that openness can in°uence aggregate demand through
a®ecting both the potential real interest rate r
pot
t , and the sensitivity of the output gap to
a given-sized real interest rate change (this sensitivity is determined by ¾open(1 ¡ gy)). The
interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand increases with openness if the trade price elasticity
exceeds the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption; conversely, the interest-
sensitivity decreases if the trade price elasticity is relatively low.
It is apparent that openness in°uences aggregate supply directly through a®ecting the
sensitivity of the household's MRS to the employment gap, i.e., the parameter ¸mrs in
equation (35). The e®ects of this slope change on price-setting are most pronounced in the
26special case of fully °exible wages. In this case, equation (35) implies that the real wage
can be expressed directly in terms of the potential real wage and employment gap, i.e.,
³t = ³
pot
t + ¸mrsxLt. Substituting for the real wage into the price-setting equation (32), and
for the MPL using (34), yields an \open economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve" similar to
that derived by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (aside from allowing for indexation):
¢¼t = ¯¢¼t+1jt + ·p((¸mpl + ¸mrs)xLt) (37)
Given that ¸mpl is determined by the capital share { a small number equal to 0.35 under
our benchmark calibration { the slope of the Phillips Curve hinges crucially on ¸mrs. Under
the conditions discussed previously in which openness markedly a®ects ¸mrs, it also exerts
substantial e®ects on the Phillips Curve slope. For instance, if openness signi¯cantly reduces
¸mrs { as occurs under a high Frisch elasticity and relatively high trade price elasticity {
marginal cost and hence price in°ation are much less responsive to the output gap in a
highly open economy. In the presence of nominal wage rigidities, however, the close linkage
between the real wage and employment gap is severed, with the implication that the MRS
slope has much less of a direct impact on the transmission of shocks to marginal costs and
price in°ation. Even so, changes in the MRS slope due to openness can have an important
impact on the behavior of wage in°ation.
Openness also in°uences aggregate supply through altering the response of the potential
real wage ³
pot
t : from equations (32) - (35), it is evident that ³
pot
t a®ects both price- and wage-
setting behavior. Because openness a®ects ³
pot
t through altering the MRS slope ¸mrs as well
as the wealth e®ect of shocks on labor supply (as discussed above, following equation 30), this
provides a second, albeit indirect, channel through which the MRS slope a®ects aggregate
supply. Importantly, changes in ³
pot
t due to openness can in principle have substantial
consequences for price-setting. To see this, it is useful to substitute equation (34) into (32)
to obtain:
¢¼t = ¯¢¼t+1jt + ·p(³t ¡ ³
pot
t + ¸mplxLt) (38)
Thus, in the presence of sticky nominal wages, price in°ation depends on the wage gap
27³t ¡ ³
pot
t in addition to the employment gap xLt. Even a policy that closed the employment
(or output) gap would imply pressure on in°ation if real wages did not immediately adjust
to their potential level, implying a policymaker tradeo® between stabilizing in°ation and
the employment gap. As might be expected, the size of the real wage gap matters for
this tradeo®, and for the transmission of shocks to in°ation. Because the actual real wage
adjusts sluggishly, the behavior of the wage gap depends critically on the potential real wage,
which varies with openness. Accordingly, to the extent that openness reduces variation in the
potential real wage { as under our benchmark calibration { greater openness can be expected
to reduce the real wage gap associated with a zero employment gap, allowing policymakers
to come closer to stabilizing both employment and in°ation. But recalling Tables 1 and
2, openness does not exert large quantitative e®ects on ³
pot
t under reasonable calibrations:
even with the high Frisch elasticity of unity, increased openness only has a modest e®ect in
dampening the response of ³
pot
t to real shocks.
Notwithstanding that it is helpful for economic interpretation to think of openness as
operating through several channels that a®ect aggregate supply and demand, it is bears
emphasizing that the composite parameter ¾open provides a summary statistic for how the
model economy is a®ected by openness. As an implication, di®erences between closed and
open economy responses { including of nominal variables such as in°ation { can only be
substantial under conditions that induce a signi¯cant disparity between ¾open and the in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity ¾. Moreover, while such a wedge is clearly a su±cient
condition for the IS curve (31) to be a®ected by openness, the e®ects of openness on the AS
block still tend to be quite small under plausible calibrations of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.
These considerations are useful in interpreting how impulse responses to the same three
shocks considered above in our SIGMA simulations depend on the openness of the economy.
Figure 6 compares responses to a 1 percentage point decline in the in°ation target under
three calibrations of openness, ranging from a trade share of 1 percent of GDP under the
\nearly closed" calibration, to 12 percent under our benchmark, to 35 percent under `high
28openness."19 It is evident that output contracts by a somewhat larger amount in the highly
open economy. The larger output contraction occurs because the target reduction causes a
rise in real interest rates, and the interest-sensitivity of output rises with greater openness
in our benchmark calibration (quantitatively, the interest-sensitivity ¾open(1 ¡ gy) rises from
0.5*(1-.18) = 0.41 under the \nearly closed" calibration to 0.90 in the high openness case).
Price in°ation also falls a bit more as openness increases, re°ecting the larger output con-
traction; however, the low sensitivity of marginal cost to the employment gap (i.e., ¸mpl in
equation (34) is only 0.35) accounts for the small quantitative di®erences in the responses.20
Overall, given the wide di®erences in the trade shares, the responses of aggregate output, in-
°ation, and the real interest rate seem quite unresponsive to openness. The main di®erences
are that exports account for a larger share of the output contraction as openness increases
(i.e., exports/GDP fall by more), and that consumer price in°ation falls more abruptly in
the highly open economy (as the real exchange rate appreciation exerts a larger e®ect given
the greater share of imported goods in the household consumption bundle).
Figure 7 compares the e®ects of a rise in government spending across the three calibra-
tions. The responses of output and in°ation diverge noticeably with openness, with output
and in°ation rising much less under the high openness calibration. Because the Taylor rule
keeps output close to potential (ypot), the di®erences in the output responses mainly re°ect
that the wealth e®ect on labor supply is smaller in a relatively open economy (as noted in
our discussion of the °exible price equilibrium). Given sluggish wage adjustment, the smaller
output expansion in turn reduces pressure on marginal cost in the more open economy. In
terms of our discussion of (38), the real wage gap ³t ¡ ³
pot
t is smaller and less persistent in
a relatively open economy (as ³pot falls by less), and hence generates weaker pressure on
19The simulations are derived in the two country version of the model in which the home country constitutes
25 percent of world output. However, it makes little di®erence to our results if the relative size of the home
country were set close to zero (even in the high openness case, we found that the sensitivity of the simulation
results to the relative size of the home economy is quite small.)
20Moreover, as suggested by our discussion above, di®erences in the MRS slope due to openness have little
in°uence on the real wage response. Thus, with the potential real wage una®ected by the shock, the real
wage gap in equation (38) behaves similarly irrespective of openness, so that marginal cost depends mainly
on the response of the employment (or output) gap.
29in°ation. Finally, the higher interest-elasticity of aggregate demand translates into less real
interest rate adjustment in the highly open economy.
Figure 8 compares the e®ects of a highly persistent rise in technology. The response of
output is somewhat larger in the highly open calibration, while the response of the real wage
is smaller. To understand this, recall from our discussion of the °exible price equilibrium
that greater openness (assuming ´c > ¾ as under our benchmark calibration) tends to damp
the wealth e®ect of the shock on labor supply. This boosts potential output { and thus
accounts for some of the larger output increase in the ¯gure in the high openness case {
while reducing the rise in the °exible price real wage. The smaller real wage gap (in absolute
value) helps account for some of the less pronounced decline in in°ation. In addition, as we
discuss in Section 3.8, some of the disparity in the output and in°ation responses re°ects
that the Taylor rule in e®ect fails to account for the higher interest-sensitivity of the economy
as openness increases; thus, an alternative policy that kept output at potential would imply
a smaller disparity in the output and in°ation responses than depicted in the ¯gure.
But notwithstanding some di®erences, the salient feature of the foregoing results is that
even substantial variation in openness seems to have fairly small e®ects on the responses,
except in the case of the government spending shock. Moreover, the SIGMA simulations
discussed in Section 2 indicate that some of the disparities in the responses to the ¯scal
shock would narrow with the inclusion of endogenous capital, and adjustment costs on the
expenditure components; notably, endogenous capital would reduce the pronounced disparity
between the interest elasticity of private absorption and of trade °ows under our benchmark
calibration, so that the interest elasticity of demand would rise by less as openness increased.
We conclude this section by illustrating a case in which openness exerts fairly dramatic
e®ects on the impulse responses of the model. In particular, Figure 9 shows responses
to the technology shock under an alternative calibration that imposes a very high trade
price elasticity of 6, and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of unity. As seen in Table 2,
the parameter ¾open rises from 0.5 under the \nearly closed" calibration to 3.6 in the high
openness case, consistent with roughly a halving of the slope of the MRS schedule (from
303.5 to 1.8). Given that the wealth e®ect on labor supply diminishes rapidly with greater
openness under this calibration, output exhibits a much more pronounced rise in the highly
open economy. The smaller rise in the real wage in the highly open economy implies a
much smaller real wage gap (in absolute value), and accounts for why in°ation falls only
about half as much on impact as in the closed economy. Accordingly, as suggested by the
¯gure, a policymaker concerned about the variability of domestic price in°ation and the
output gap would face a markedly improved tradeo® locus in the open economy. However,
we emphasize that this large divergence hinges on a high Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
and a fairly extreme assumption about the trade price elasticity.
3.8 Variance Tradeo® Frontiers
A limitation of our preceding analysis that characterized policy as following a simple (Taylor-
style) interest rate reaction function is that it is di±cult to disentangle what components of
the transmission channel change with trade openness. In particular, it is hard to ascertain
whether di®erences are attributable to disparities in the \IS" block of the model, i.e., in the
interest-sensitivity of the economy, or in the equations governing aggregate supply.
Toward this end, it is useful to follow Taylor (1979) in characterizing the variance tradeo®
frontier of the home economy. Accordingly, we assume that the monetary policy of the home











where ¸x is the relative weight on the output gap. The policymaker is assumed to minimize
the loss function subject to the log-linearized behavioral equations of the model, while taking
as given that monetary policy in the foreign economy continues to follow a Taylor rule.21
21The variance tradeo® frontier is not very sensitive to the relative size of the home country. Hence,
although we derive our results assuming that the home country constitutes 25 percent of world output, the
tradeo® frontiers are not markedly di®erent in the case in which the home country share of world output
is close to zero. In the latter case, the policymaker tradeo® frontier can be derived by minimizing the loss
31This case parallels related analysis in a closed economy setting (as in Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and
Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)) insofar as the optimal policy does not depend on the
model's IS curve (at least given our assumption that the policymaker's loss function does
not penalize interest rate variability).
The left panel of Figure 10 shows a policy tradeo® frontier between in°ation and output
gap variability for the case of a technology shock. The tradeo® frontier is obtained by
minimizing the policymaker's loss function (39) over all possible values of ¸x subject to
the log-linearized behavioral equations.22 For visual clarity, the tradeo® frontiers are shown
only for the alternative calibrations of a highly open economy (in which the trade share
is 35 percent), and the nearly closed case (with a trade share of 1 percent). Under either
calibration, the standard deviation of in°ation declines to zero as the policymaker's weight
on the output gap ¸x declines to zero, while the standard deviation of the output gap declines
to zero as ¸x approaches in¯nity.
As is familiar from closed-economy analysis, the presence of wage rigidities gives rise to a
tradeo® between stabilizing the output gap and in°ation. However, the striking feature of the
¯gure is that the tradeo® frontiers are virtually identical, notwithstanding very pronounced
di®erences in trade openness. This similarity re°ects that the only channels through which
trade openness can in°uence the tradeo® frontier is by a®ecting the slope of the MRS schedule
(recalling the MPL is invariant), or by a®ecting the potential real wage ³
pot
t ; as noted above,
while openness a®ects the slope of the IS curve and potential real interest rate r
pot
t , this is
inconsequential for a policymaker loss function such as (39) that does not explicitly depend
on the interest rate. Thus, insofar as it is clear from Table 1 that the potential real wage
and slope of the MRS show little variation with openness under our benchmark calibration,
it is unsurprising that the policy frontiers are nearly identical.
Although the policy tradeo® frontiers are nearly identical, the right panel { which plots
function subject to the behavioral equations (31)- (36) that apply in the small open economy variant of our
model.
22Note that the vertical axis shows the standard deviation of in°ation, and the horizontal axis the standard
deviation of the output gap.
32how interest rate volatility varies with ¸x { shows that implementation of the policy implies
considerably less real interest variation in the more open economy.23 This simply re°ects
that openness markedly raises the interest sensitivity of the economy, even if not the slope of
the MRS schedule and ³
pot
t (as seen from Table 1, ¾open rises from 0.5 in the closed economy
case to 1.1 when the trade share is 35 percent). Thus, some of the relatively small di®erences
in the transmission of the technology shock shown in Figure 8 are in fact attributable to
the aggregate demand block of the model. For example, the optimal rule that puts a high
enough weight on output gap stabilization to keep output at potential (i.e., a very large ¸x)
implies output and in°ation responses that are even closer than those depicted in Figure 8
(as easily veri¯ed by plotting impulse responses for this calibration of the optimal rule).
Figure 11 considers how the highly open and closed economy policy frontiers shift given
changes in key structural parameters that a®ect the slope of the MRS schedule. The upper
panel shows that even adopting an extremely high value of the trade price elasticity ´c of
3, and a fairly high Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.5 (i.e., Â = 2), is not su±cient
to induce much of a disparity between the tradeo® frontiers. Not surprisingly, the high
trade price elasticity does drive a large wedge in the variability of the interest rate response
associated with any given policy rule, i.e., value of ¸x.
The policy frontiers may show considerable more variation with openness, but only under
rather extreme calibrations. Thus, the middle panel shows that the open economy tradeo®
frontier would move further inside the (nearly) closed economy frontier in the case in which
both the trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply are extremely high (´c = 6,
and the value of Â of .05 implies a Frisch elasticity of 20). In this case, the wealth e®ect
dominates the behavior of the MRS slope, so that the latter °attens considerably with
openness. Provided that the MPL slopes downward enough, the response of the potential
real wage is damped considerably as openness increases; and because real wages are sticky,
this improves the tradeo® locus open to policymakers in the highly open economy. However,
23Note that Figures 10 and 11 depict the relative weight on the output gap using an exponential scale, so
that e.g., the tick label -5 corresponds to a weight of unity on in°ation, and exp(-5) on the output gap.
33the manner in which the tradeo® frontier varies with openness in an environment with an
extremely °at MRS tends to be quite sensitive to the slope of the MPL schedule (unlike
under our benchmark, in which the frontier is much less sensitive to the slope of the MPL).
As illustrated by the last panel, the open economy tradeo® frontier actually lies well outside
the closed economy frontier if the MPL slope is reduced to 0.05 in absolute value.
4 Alternative Model Speci¯cations
Our workhorse model made a number of simplifying assumptions to keep the analysis
tractable. We now investigate the robustness of these conclusions to several extensions of
the model, including incomplete asset markets, endogenous capital accumulation, imported
intermediate goods, and local currency pricing.
4.1 Incomplete International Financial Markets
Our baseline model assumes that asset markets are complete both domestically and inter-
nationally. However, as this is an extreme assumption, we now consider an alternative in
which households only have access to a non-state contingent international bond.






ÁFt(bFt+1) = Wt (h)Nt (h) + RKtK+
¡t (h) ¡ Tt (h) + BDt(h) + etBFt(h):
(40)
where BFt+1(h) denotes the household's purchases of the foreign bond, P ¤
Ft is the price of
the foreign bond (in foreign currency), and BDt+1(h) denotes state-contingent bonds traded
amongst domestic households. We follow Turnovsky (1985) and assume there is an interme-
diation cost, ÁF(bFt+1), paid by domestic households for purchases of the international bond
to ensure that net foreign assets are stationary.24 This intermediation cost depends on the









24 This intermediation cost is asymmetric, as foreign households do not face this cost; rather, they collect
pro¯ts on the monopoly rents associated with the intermediation costs.
34and rises when the home country is a net debtor. We set ÀF to be very small (ÀF = 0:001),
which e®ectively implies that uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model.
Given this alternative ¯nancial structure, the risk sharing condition (i.e., equation (20))
no longer holds and the domestic economy's level of net foreign assets in°uences model
dynamics. To understand how, we begin by considering the demand side of the model. As
in Section 3, it remains possible to derive a (log-linearized) open-economy IS curve of the
form:
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ gy)¾
openfrt ¡ r
¤
tg + ²bFbFt+1 + uISt; (42)
where ²bF = (1¡gy)(¾(1¡!c)¡¾open)ÀF, and uISt = gy(gt ¡Etgt+1)+(1¡gy)(c¤
t ¡Etc¤
t+1).
This expression for the IS curve is the same as in the workhorse model (expression (25))
except that it involves the home country's net foreign asset position due to the presence of
the intermediation cost. Since we set ÀF to be very small, ²bF is very small, and the IS curve
is virtually unchanged vis-¶ a-vis the workhorse model.
Under incomplete markets, however, the IS curve does not provide a complete descrip-
tion of aggregate demand. Intuitively, the IS curve determines how aggregate demand grows
through time, but the current level is only pinned down by the intertemporal budget con-
straints of households, which at a national level constrains the evolution of net foreign assets.
Accordingly, the aggregate demand block also includes a (log-linearized) law of motion spec-








where nst is the country's total income less household and government expenditures (i.e.,
nst = [yt ¡(1¡gy)ct ¡gygct ¡(1¡gy)!c¿t]). Because consumption depends only on output
and the terms of trade (given the resource constraint and equation for real net exports), net
savings can also be expressed simply in terms of output and the terms of trade. Finally,
the terms of trade are determined by a modi¯ed uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition,
which is the same as in the workhorse model except that it re°ects the presence of the
35intermediation cost:
¿t = Et¿t+1 + r
¤
t ¡ rt ¡ ÀFbFt+1 = (r
¤




where rLt corresponds to the domestic long-term real interest rate (see equation (24)).
Turning to aggregate supply, the MPL schedule remains unchanged under incomplete
markets, as discussed in Section 3. However, the MRS schedule is in°uenced by the country's
ability to borrow and lend, so that changes in the home country's net foreign asset position
in°uence aggregate supply. In particular, the marginal rate of substitution (in product terms)
can be written as:














This expression for the marginal rate of substitution is similar to the one for the closed
economy (i.e., equation (29)), except for the inclusion of the last two terms involving net
savings and the terms of trade. Clearly, for the special case of ¾ = 1, the terms of trade drops
from the above equation, so that the only di®erence between the closed and open economy
expression for the marginal rate of substitution involves the term in net savings. An increase
in net savings, all else equal, lowers the marginal rate of substitution, which under °exible
prices and wages, lowers the product real wage. By contrast, this e®ect is absent in a closed
economy, since nst = 0.
The above discussion suggests that the e®ects of domestic shocks may diverge consid-
erably between a closed and open economy if the IS curve slope is sensitive to the degree
of trade openness (for the same reasons discussed in Section 3), or if the shocks exert large
e®ects on net savings. To investigate the quantitative e®ects of openness under our bench-
mark calibration, the right column of Figure 12 shows the responses of output, domestic
in°ation, and consumption to a persistent rise in technology (the AR(1) coe±cient equals
0.97) for di®erent degrees of trade openness under incomplete markets; for point of reference,
corresponding results under complete markets are shown in the left column. Clearly, under
either ¯nancial structure, technology shocks have somewhat larger e®ects on output, and
36smaller e®ects on in°ation, as the openness of the economy increases. This re°ects that
openness damps the expansion in consumption under either ¯nancial market structure: un-
der complete markets, because of insurance arrangements, while under incomplete markets
it re°ects an increase in desired saving because current income exceeds permanent income.
As observed in Section 3, the smaller implied wealth e®ect on labor supply translates into a
larger output response, and mitigates the decline in in°ation. Nevertheless, the di®erences in
the responses of output and in°ation appear fairly small given the large changes in openness
examined. The modest size of the disparities re°ects that home and foreign goods are not
substitutable enough in our benchmark calibration to have large e®ects on the MRS schedule
(i.e., net savings does not change enough to exert much of an e®ect on the MRS schedule
given by equation (45)).
To demonstrate that there can potentially be large di®erences between an open and
closed economy under incomplete markets, Figure 13 shows the e®ects of a more transitory
technology shock (the AR(1) coe±cient equals 0.8) on output under three alternative cali-
brations of the trade price elasticity and the Frisch labor supply elasticity. We consider a
transitory shock rather than a permanent shock, because, regardless of the degree of open-
ness, consumption will rise immediately to its new higher level in response to a permanent
shock without any change in aggregate savings.
The top panel shows the e®ect on output under a trade price elasticity of 6 (keeping the
Frisch elasticity at its benchmark value of 0.2, so Â = 5). The combination of the more
transient shock and greater substitutability between home and foreign goods generates a
larger increase in net savings in the domestic economy, and hence larger output di®erences
than under the benchmark calibration. As shown in the middle and lower panels, these
di®erences in the output responses become even larger as the labor supply curve becomes
more elastic (i.e., a lower value of Â) and as the trade price elasticity increases. However,
it bears reiterating that rather extreme calibrations of the trade price elasticity (and a high
Frisch elasticity) seem required for the responses to show large divergence based on openness.
374.2 Endogenous Investment
We next investigate the robustness of our results to including endogenous investment into
the workhorse model of Section 3. In the modi¯ed framework, households augment their
stock of capital according to:
Kt+1(h) = (1 ¡ ±)Kt(h) + It(h); (46)
where It(h) and Kt(h) denote household investment and the beginning of period t stock of
capital, respectively. The household budget constraint is also modi¯ed to re°ect investment
purchases:
PCtCt (h) + PCtIt (h) +
R
s »t;t+1Bt+1(h) = Wt (h)Nt (h) + RKtKt(h)+
¡t (h) ¡ Tt (h) + Bt(h) ¡ PDtÁIt(h): (47)








Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), it is costly to change the level of invest-
ment from the previous period. Investment goods are produced using the same technology
as ¯nal consumption goods (see equation (13)), and hence require both the domestically-
produced composite good as well as imports. The import share of investment goods and
elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports in the production function for
investment is assumed to be the same as for consumption.
The inclusion of endogenous investment tends to markedly boost the interest-sensitivity
of domestic demand under plausible calibrations. Accordingly, as suggested by the SIGMA
simulations in Section 2, the interest-sensitivity should be expected to rise less steeply with
openness compared with the workhorse model; in fact, the aggregate interest-sensitivity of
the economy can even decline with greater openness if investment is su±ciently interest-
sensitive.
To illustrate these points, the upper panel of Figure 14 reexamines the reduction in the
in°ation target shock in the augmented model with investment. The calibration in the top
38panel sets the adjustment cost on investment parameter ÁI = 0:2, which e®ectively serves to
equalize the interest elasticity of domestic demand and of real net exports (notwithstanding
that the interest elasticity of consumption is unchanged from our benchmark calibration).
In contrast to the model with ¯xed capital (see Figure 6), which implied a modestly larger
output contraction in the highly open economy relative to the closed economy, the response
of both output and in°ation is nearly invariant to trade openness . The virtually identical
output responses re°ect that the e®ective interest sensitivity of domestic demand is very close
to that of real net exports, so that putting a higher weight on the latter as trade openness
rises has little e®ect on the overall interest sensitivity of the economy. The similar output
responses across the calibrations translate into commensurate e®ects on marginal cost and
in°ation.
The two lower panels consider alternative calibrations which show that the general con-
ditions highlighted in Section 3 as potentially giving rise to large di®erences between closed
and open economies continue to remain operative under endogenous capital accumulation.
Thus, the middle panel considers the case in which the trade price elasticity is set to 6,
rather than 1.5 as in our benchmark. In this case, the interest-sensitivity of real net exports
is much higher than that of domestic demand, so that the aggregate interest-sensitivity of the
economy rises with openness, and output shows a larger contraction as openness increases.
The ¯nal panel keeps the trade price elasticity at its benchmark value of 1.5, but increases
the e®ective interest-sensitivity of domestic demand relative to the ¯rst panel by reducing
the adjustment cost parameter ÁI to 0.01. In this case, output contracts by somewhat more
in the closed than in the open economy.
4.3 Imported Materials
Our workhorse model treats imports as ¯nished goods. However, many imported goods
are used as intermediate inputs in production, and their use in production may alter the
transmission of domestic shocks.
To investigate this possibility, we follow McCallum and Nelson (1999) and modify the
39production process of intermediate goods producers discussed in Section 3 so that gross


















In the above, value-added for good i is produced via a Cobb-Douglas production function and
combined with ¯rm i's purchases of the foreign aggregate good used as intermediate inputs,
MY t(i) to produce the gross output of good i. Also, the parameter !L determines the share
of imported materials in gross production, and ´L =
1+½L
½L is the elasticity of substitution
between value-added and imported materials. We assume that capital, labor, and imported
materials are perfectly mobile across ¯rms within a country so that all ¯rms have identical












where MCV t is marginal cost per unit of value-added de¯ned earlier as equation (10).
The inclusion of intermediate inputs in the model changes the home economy's resource
constraint so that:









Y t denote exports of the domestic good used as an intermediate inputs. Market





Relative to the workhorse model, allowing for °uctuations in imported materials provides
another channel through which openness a®ects the MPL schedule. In particular, a terms
of trade appreciation increases labor demand by an amount that depends crucially on the
value of !L.
An additional channel through which imported materials a®ects the domestic economy is
by altering the sensitivity of demand to interest rates. As discussed in the Appendix, under
40the assumption of °exible wages and ® = 0 so that value added is linear in labor, the IS
curve is given by:
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ gy)¾
open
M frt ¡ r
¤
tg + uISt; (53)
where uISt is a term re°ecting the government spending shock and foreign shocks. This
expression con¯rms that it remains possible to follow the basic logic of Section 3 to derive a
new composite parameter, ¾
open
M , which has the interpretation of the elasticity of aggregate
demand to real interest rates. This elasticity ¾
open
M can be related to the one obtained in the




(1¡gy). Accordingly, the interest
rate sensitivity of demand can be regarded as a weighted average of the interest-sensitivity
of consumption, real net exports of ¯nal goods, and real net exports of intermediate inputs.
Because the elasticity of substitution between value added and materials is fairly low,
the inclusion of imported materials can reduce the di®erence in interest-rate elasticities of
demand between an open and closed economy. For example, consider a share of imported
materials in gross production of 5 percent (!L = 0:05), and elasticity of substitution between
value added and materials of 1/3, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999). With these values
along with our benchmark values for ¾ = 0:5, !c = 0:12, ´c = 1:5, and gy = 0:18, then
¾
open
M = 0:70 instead of ¾open = 0:72.
The presence of imported materials also a®ects the pricing decisions of intermediate
producers by altering their marginal costs. In particular, producers set gross output prices
in a staggered fashion rather than value-added prices, and the ¯rst order condition for the












Yt+j (i) = 0; (54)
where PDt (i) now has an interpretation as a gross output price and VDt+j =
Qj
h=1 ¼t+h¡1.
Equation (54) can be log-linearized and rewritten as:
¼t ¡ ¼t¡1 = ¯(¼t+1jt ¡ ¼t) + ·p [(1 ¡ !L)(³t ¡ mplt) + !L¿t]: (55)
41where mplt = (1 ¡ ®)zt ¡ ®Lt; corresponds to the marginal product of labor | in terms
of value added | described in Section 3. In the previous expression we have written the
marginal cost in terms of the value-added output to make clear that with imported materials,
gross output price in°ation depends on °uctuations in the terms of trade.
Relative to the workhorse model, allowing for °uctuations in imported materials has two
e®ects on the price equation. First, the presence of materials inputs contribute to reducing
the pass-through from marginal cost to prices, thus resulting in smaller price adjustments
in response to higher nominal aggregate demand. Second, since a more open economy may
be associated with a high fraction of imported materials in gross output production (i.e, a
larger !L), °uctuations in the terms of trade may have a greater in°uence on gross output
price in°ation than in a closed economy.
To investigate the quantitative importance of imported materials, Figure 15 shows the
e®ects of a technology shock for di®erent degrees of openness. In each case, we set ´L = 1
3
and calibrated !c and !L so that material imports account for roughly 25 percent of total
imports in each economy.25 As in the workhorse model, the highly open economy experiences
a larger increase in output and smaller decline in in°ation. The inclusion of intermediate
inputs tends to dampen the fall in in°ation in response to the technology shock, re°ecting
that the fall in unit labor costs is o®set to a greater degree by higher import prices. However,
the di®erences between the highly open economy and the closed economy do not appear large,
so that the inclusion of intermediate goods only modestly ampli¯es the di®erences evident
in the workhorse model.
4.4 Pricing To Market
Our workhorse model assumed that the law of one price holds for each intermediate good.
However, there is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that the law of one price does
25 In the model with material imports, we vary both !c and !L to alter the ratio of imports to GDP in
each scenario. As a result, the more open economy is characterized by larger values of both !c and !L;
however, the fraction of material imports to overall imports is held ¯xed at 25 percent in all cases. Finally,
the simulations shown in Figure 15 restrict ® = 0, but otherwise adopt the values used in our benchmark
calibration.
42not hold. A related literature emphasizes that U.S. import prices at the point of entry
respond less than one for one with a change in the exchange rate (i.e., exchange rate pass-
through to U.S. import prices is incomplete).26 We now consider an alternative version of
our model which can account for these ¯ndings.
In this alternative version, intermediate goods ¯rms set di®erent prices at home and
abroad or `price to market'. This pricing to market behavior arises for two reasons. First,
we assume, as in Betts and Devereux (1996), intermediate goods' prices are sticky in local cur-
rency terms. We also work with aggregators for intermediate goods that have non-constant
elasticities of demand as in Kimball (1995), implying that a ¯rm may face di®erent demand
elasticities at home and abroad.27
To incorporate these features, we modify the problem of the consumption goods distrib-
utor who purchases all of the intermediate goods both at home and abroad to produce a
¯nal good that can be used either for private consumption, Ct, or government consumption,
Gt. Using the demand aggregator discussed in Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), the ¯nal


















(Ct + Gt); (56)

















(Ct + Gt): (57)
As in Dotsey and King (2005), when º 6= 0, these demand curves have a linear term which
implies that the elasticity of demand of producer i depends on its price PDt(i) relative to
an index of the prices of its competitors (see below). When º = 0, the demand elasticity
is constant and 1
1¡° has the interpretation as the elasticity of substitution between home
brands (i.e.,
1¡°
° is equivalent to µP in the workhorse model). PMt and PDt are price indices
26 For a survey of this literature, see Goldberg and Knetter (1997), and for more recent empirical evidence
for the United States, see Marazzi, Sheets, and Vigfusson (2005).
27 See Bergin and Feenstra (2001) for a discussion of how the interaction of demand curves with non-
constant elasticities with sticky prices can be helpful in accounting for exchange rate dynamics.































Intermediate goods producers sell their products to the consumption goods distributors
and can charge di®erent prices at home and abroad. These prices are determined according
to Calvo-style contracts subject to indexation. The ¯rst order condition associated with the
















VDt+jCDt+j = 0; (60)

















With º > 0, as in Kimball (1995), ²Dt(i) may be an increasing function of a ¯rm's price
relative to its competitors, and a ¯rm will not want its desired price (i.e., its optimal price
in the absence of price rigidities) to deviate too far from its competitors.
Equation (60) can be log-linearized and expressed as:




+ ·p£[³t ¡ mplt + º¹!C´c(pMt ¡ pDt)]; (62)
where ¹ = 1
²D¡1 denotes the steady state (net) markup over marginal cost, ²D = 1
(1¡°)(1¡º) is
the steady state value of ²Dt(i), and ´c =
½
(½¡°)(1¡º) denotes the aggregate elasticity between
home and foreign goods in steady state. The parameter £ = 1
1+º(1+¹) < 1 re°ects the degree
of `strategic' complementarity in price-setting (e.g., Woodford (2003)). That is, with º = 0,
a ¯rm's demand elasticity is constant, and this expression is the same as in the workhorse
model. With º > 0, there are variations in desired markups associated with changes in a
44¯rm's price relative to its competitors. In this case, in°ation is less sensitive to marginal
cost, and in the open economy more sensitive to foreign prices. Furthermore, the importance
of foreign prices in a®ecting domestic in°ation depends directly on the degree of openness,
!C.
According to equation (62), foreign competition can in°uence domestic in°ation through
changes in desired markups. This expression is reminiscent of Dornbusch and Fischer (1984),
who described how foreign competition could in°uence the desired markups of domestic
¯rms and e®ectively change the slope of the Phillips curve. In particular, they argued that
monetary shocks were likely to cause domestic prices in an open economy to respond more
quickly, which they interpreted as a steepening of the slope of the Phillips Curve. From a
qualitative perspective, monetary policy shocks can also steepen the Phillips curve in our
model with variable markups. In particular, a monetary contraction occurring in response
to a decrease in the central bank's in°ation target lowers marginal cost and generates a real
appreciation of the domestic currency. This appreciation lowers import prices relative to
domestic prices, and domestic producers respond by reducing their desired markups. As a
result, domestic price in°ation can appear more sensitive to the fall in demand associated
with the monetary contraction.
However, we emphasize that the source of the shock in our framework has crucial bearing
for the question of whether in°ation becomes more or less sensitive to aggregate demand.
For example, in response to a government spending shock, in°ation can appear less sensitive
to demand. Higher government spending puts upward pressure on marginal cost but the real
exchange rate appreciates. This appreciation reduces relative import prices, forcing domestic
producers to lower their desired markups. This reduction in desired markups has the e®ect
of making domestic price in°ation less sensitive to the increase in aggregate demand.
A domestic ¯rm also sets a sticky price in the local currency of the foreign economy.
These prices are also determined according to Calvo-style contracts indexed to lagged foreign
import price in°ation, with the log-linearized ¯rst order condition associated with domestic















where qDt = p¤
Dt+et¡p¤
Dt is the real exchange rate in terms of domestic prices. This equation
implies that foreign import prices (i.e., domestic export prices in units of the foreign currency)
do not respond fully to changes in domestic marginal cost, or to changes in real exchange
rates. In turn, the response of real trade °ows is also muted. In contrast, in the workhorse
model, changes in exchange rates have a relatively large e®ect on import prices and thus on
real trade °ows.
Figure 16 shows the e®ects of a technology shock for di®erent degrees of openness in
both the workhorse model with a constant elasticity of demand and the model with variable
markups and pricing to market. For the model with variable markups, we set º = 3, ½
such that the aggregate elasticity ´c equals its benchmark value of 1.5, and ° so that the
steady state markup is 20 percent. Under our benchmark calibration, the variation in desired
markups mutes the responsiveness of import and export prices to exchange rate changes and
reduces the interest sensitivity of real trade °ows. Comparing the top panels, there is a
smaller di®erence in the response of output across the three calibrations in the pricing to
market model, re°ecting the lower sensitivity of aggregate demand to changes in interest
rates. The response of output is also more persistent in the model, re°ecting the higher
degree of strategic complementarities associated with the variable desired markups.
The higher degree of strategic complementarity also implies less pass-through from
marginal cost to domestic prices. Hence, there is a smaller response of in°ation in the
variable desired markups model than the workhorse model, regardless of the degree of open-
ness. In addition, there are relatively large di®erences in the response of domestic in°ation
across the three calibrations in the variable markups model. Given that import prices rise,
domestic ¯rms have an incentive to raise their markups in response to weaker competition
from imports, thus mitigating the fall in domestic price in°ation. This e®ect is clearly more
important in a highly open economy than in a relatively closed economy.
465 Conclusion
In this paper, we used an open economy DSGE model to explore how trade openness a®ects
the transmission of domestic shocks. Our results indicate that increased trade openness
and international linkages are likely to have fairly modest implications for real activity and
in°ation, though more pronounced e®ects on the composition of expenditure and the wedge
between consumer and domestic prices. Accordingly, to the extent that openness changes
the behavior of the domestic economy, it seems plausible that the main e®ects would occur
through an increased role of foreign shocks.
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50Appendix
This appendix describes how the presence of imported materials a®ect the overall elas-
ticity of demand with respect to the real interest rate.
Proceeding as in Section 3, simple algebraic manipulations allow us to obtain a rela-
tionship among domestic output, the terms of trade, and domestic and foreign shocks. A
log-linear approximation to the aggregate resource constraint can be written as follows:




Y t + (1 ¡ !L)gygt
Following the steps used in Section 3, the term in brackets f(1¡!c)cDt +!cm¤
Ctg can be
written in terms of foreign consumption and terms of trade (i.e. (¾open¿t¡c¤
Dt)(1¡gy)(1¡!L)).
The task then is to ¯nd an expression that relates m¤
Y t to foreign variables and the terms of
trade. Import demand of materials in the foreign economy is given by:28
m
¤
Y t = y
¤









Assuming that wages are °exible, we can use the MRS in the foreign economy to express
the foreign product real wage real wage in terms of foreign variables and the terms of trade.













t represents a combination of foreign variables. Relative to the benchmark model,
the previous expression makes clear that °uctuations in imported materials introduce an
additional e®ect of the terms of trade on domestic output, whose intensity depends upon
the share of imported materials on gross production (!L), the share of imports of the foreign
economy (!¤
c) and the elasticity of substitution of materials (´L) and value added in gross
production. The previous expression can be rearranged as follows:
yDt = (¾
open
M ¿t ¡ (1 ¡ !L)c
¤























If !L = 0, this expression is the same as the one for the workhorse model.
28 For convenience, we assume that the value added function is linear in labor (® = 0).
51Table 1: Slope of Reduced Form MRS Schedule for Alternative Calibrations
Benchmark Frisch Elasticity (Â¡1 = 0:2)
Flexible Price Responses to:
Parameters Technology Shock Government Spending Shock















0 0.25 1 0.25 12 0.6 0.49 -0.25 0.74 -0.82 0.33 -0.18
0.5 1 0.5 9.7 0.72 0.59 -0.098 0.68 -0.98 0.2 -0.11
1 1 1 8.7 0.79 0.65 0 0.65 -1.1 0.11 -0.058
0.12 0.25 1 0.42 10 0.36 0.56 -0.13 0.7 -0.49 0.22 -0.12
0.25 1.5 0.53 9.6 0.3 0.59 -0.088 0.68 -0.41 0.19 -0.1
0.25 6 1.5 8.4 0.12 0.67 0.038 0.64 -0.16 0.074 -0.04
0.5 1 0.61 9.3 0.53 0.61 -0.064 0.67 -0.73 0.17 -0.089
0.5 1.5 0.72 9.1 0.46 0.62 -0.039 0.66 -0.63 0.14 -0.077
0.5 6 1.7 8.3 0.21 0.68 0.048 0.63 -0.29 0.066 -0.035
1 1 1 8.7 0.7 0.65 0 0.65 -0.96 0.11 -0.058
1 1.5 1.1 8.6 0.63 0.66 0.011 0.65 -0.87 0.098 -0.053
1 6 2.1 8.2 0.35 0.69 0.061 0.63 -0.48 0.054 -0.029
0.35 0.25 1 0.68 9.2 0.18 0.62 -0.049 0.67 -0.24 0.15 -0.082
0.25 1.5 0.96 8.7 0.13 0.65 -0.0047 0.65 -0.18 0.11 -0.061
0.25 6 3.3 8 0.039 0.7 0.082 0.62 -0.053 0.035 -0.019
0.5 1 0.79 9 0.32 0.63 -0.028 0.66 -0.43 0.13 -0.072
0.5 1.5 1.1 8.6 0.24 0.65 0.0074 0.65 -0.33 0.1 -0.055
0.5 6 3.6 8 0.075 0.7 0.084 0.62 -0.1 0.033 -0.018
1 1 1 8.7 0.51 0.65 0 0.65 -0.7 0.11 -0.058
1 1.5 1.3 8.5 0.41 0.67 0.025 0.64 -0.56 0.086 -0.046
1 6 3.8 8 0.14 0.71 0.087 0.62 -0.2 0.031 -0.017
52Table 2: Slope of Reduced Form MRS Schedule for Alternative Calibrations
Higher Frisch Elasticity (Â¡1 = 1)
Flexible Price Responses to:
Parameters Technology Shock Government Spending Shock















0 0.25 1 0.25 5.5 0.4 0.33 -0.49 0.82 -0.42 0.66 -0.35
0.5 1 0.5 3.5 0.6 0.49 -0.25 0.74 -0.62 0.49 -0.26
1 1 1 2.5 0.79 0.65 0 0.65 -0.82 0.33 -0.17
0.12 0.25 1 0.42 3.9 0.29 0.45 -0.31 0.76 -0.3 0.53 -0.29
0.25 1.5 0.53 3.4 0.25 0.5 -0.22 0.73 -0.26 0.48 -0.26
0.25 6 1.5 2.2 0.13 0.73 0.12 0.61 -0.13 0.24 -0.13
0.5 1 0.61 3.2 0.47 0.54 -0.17 0.71 -0.49 0.44 -0.24
0.5 1.5 0.72 2.9 0.43 0.58 -0.11 0.69 -0.44 0.4 -0.21
0.5 6 1.7 2.1 0.23 0.75 0.16 0.59 -0.24 0.22 -0.12
1 1 1 2.5 0.7 0.65 0 0.65 -0.72 0.33 -0.17
1 1.5 1.1 2.4 0.65 0.67 0.034 0.64 -0.67 0.3 -0.16
1 6 2.1 2 0.39 0.78 0.21 0.58 -0.41 0.19 -0.1
0.35 0.25 1 0.68 3 0.16 0.56 -0.13 0.7 -0.17 0.42 -0.22
0.25 1.5 0.96 2.6 0.13 0.64 -0.014 0.65 -0.13 0.33 -0.18
0.25 6 3.3 1.8 0.046 0.84 0.29 0.55 -0.048 0.13 -0.068
0.5 1 0.79 2.8 0.3 0.6 -0.081 0.68 -0.31 0.38 -0.2
0.5 1.5 1.1 2.5 0.24 0.66 0.022 0.64 -0.25 0.31 -0.17
0.5 6 3.6 1.8 0.091 0.85 0.3 0.54 -0.094 0.12 -0.064
1 1 1 2.5 0.51 0.65 0 0.65 -0.53 0.33 -0.17
1 1.5 1.3 2.3 0.43 0.7 0.078 0.62 -0.44 0.27 -0.15
1 6 3.8 1.8 0.17 0.86 0.32 0.54 -0.18 0.11 -0.06
53Figure 1: Permanent Reduction in the In°ation Target in SIGMA
(Deviation from Steady State)
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54Figure 2: Disin°ation Episodes in U.S., Canada, and the U.K.





























































































































55Figure 3: Increase in Government Spending in SIGMA
(Deviation from Steady State)



















1 yr. Real Interest Rate











































Real Export Share of Output
Quarters
56Figure 4: Increase in Technology in SIGMA
(Deviation from Steady State)
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57Figure 5: Rise in Technology: Closed vs. Open
Labor Market Equilibrium under Flexible Prices and Wages












































































58Figure 6: Increase in In°ation Target in Workhorse Model
(Deviation from Steady State)
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59Figure 7: Increase in Government Spending in Workhorse Model
(Deviation from Steady State)
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60Figure 8: Increase in Technology in Workhorse Model
(Deviation from Steady State)
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61Figure 9: Increase in Technology in Workhorse Model
(Alternative Calibration: ´ = 6 and Â¡1 = 1)
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62Figure 10: Policy Tradeo® Frontier for Technology Shock
Benchmark Calibration
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63Figure 11: Policy Tradeo® Frontier for Technology Shock
Alternative Calibrations
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64Figure 12: Persistent Increase in Technology: Complete vs. Incomplete Markets































































65Figure 13: The E®ect on Output of a More Transitory Increase in Technology
(Alternative Calibrations of Incomplete Markets Model)
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66Figure 14: Reduction in In°ation Target in Endogenous Investment Model
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67Figure 15: Increase in Technology: Workhorse Model vs. Imported Materials Model
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68Figure 16: Increase in Technology: Workhorse Model vs. Variable Desired Markups Model
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